@7our's blog

L'adresse du blog a changée. Depuis le 2 janvier 2012, l'adresse est 7our.wordpress.com.

This blog is on the following link 7our.wordpress.com since January 2, 2012.

• Quand l'APS parle du pétrole, ouvrez votre parapluie car il en pleut au nord du pays !
  La déclaration de Yousfi est insatisfaisante à plus d'un titre. Qu'est ce donc que ce taux de reconstitution des réserves d’hydrocarbures ? On parle de taux de reconstitution d'une nappe aquifère par les eaux de surface, mais pas pour le pétrole et le gaz.  On peut juste supposer que le journaliste a confondu avec le taux de renouvellement des réserves, qui n'est autre que le rapport quantités produites / quantités découvertes dans l'année. A ce propos on attend avec impatience le résultat 2011. Pour rappel, les découvertes 2010 ne couvraient que la moitié de la production de la même année. L'Algérie commence un début de déclin de son industrie phare.

• Des chiffres valent mieux qu'un long discours (surtout s'il est creux).
  D'autre part, soient les réserves ont déjà été évaluées durant l'exploration (ce qui est l'objet même de cette phase), soient elles ne l'ont pas été...et alors qualifier les résultats de "très encourageants" est un peu téméraire. Des petites nappes de pétrole et du gaz, il y en a un peu partout. Ce que l'on découvre difficilement, ce sont les nappes géantes plus faciles à exploiter et plus productives. La question principale est de savoir à quel coût se monterait l'exploitation des hydrocarbures du Nord. Et cela peut se révéler très impacté par plusieurs facteurs comme la profondeur de la nappe ou du gisement, la nature géologique du terrain, le potentiel de la découverte, etc...

• L'APS perd le Nord, en l’occurence le Sud !
  Question de géographie: où commence le Nord et où s'arrête le Sud du pays ? Les zones situés entre les wilayas de Béchar et d'El Bayadh sont au Sud-Ouest. A la même latitude que la ville de Laghouat, à proximité des champs pétroliers de Hassi Messaoud ! Pourtant les journalistes qui ont précipitamment réduit l'annonce à un titre de "premières découvertes du pétrole dans le nord du pays" semblent incidemment négliger le potentiel du Sud-Ouest. Cela en dit long sur la quête d'une nappe Nordiste miraculeuse d'hydrocarbures dans le psyché algérien.

• Le Ministre a changé, pourtant la communication est la même.
  Tout cela ressemble à un bel effet d'annonce. L'objectif est de rassurer. La baisse des investissements d'exploration et de production ne doit pas inquiéter le citoyen lambda. Sauf que le prédécesseur de Youcef Yousfi, l'irritant Chakib Khelil avait lui aussi évoqué en février 2010 “d’importantes réserves énergétiques au Nord du pays” sans donner non plus beaucoup de détails là dessus. A l'époque,  Khelil nous annonçait qu'un gisement de gaz naturel avait été découvert à 30 km de Tiaret. Un petit gisement parmi d’autres...

Y a-t-il d'autres gisements importants d'hydrocarbures en Algérie continentale ou Off-Shore ? On ne le sait pas encore. L'absence de preuve n'est pas une preuve de l'absence. Faut-il croire le Ministre du secteur lorsqu'il ne fournit pas de preuves ? Evidemment non. Si l'intention de Youcef Yousfi était de rassurer sur la pérennité de la manne algérienne d'hydrocarbures, ses propos surprennent, mais ne trompent pas longtemps les observateurs assidus.

We witnessed an acceleration of events lately in the Sahel with an almost daily flood of news. I had to change somewhat the structure of the text I was about to publish. Instead of a text too long, here's a little post on the security in Mali and about the kidnapping episode in Hombori.

Regarding the security context, we must first pay tribute to the tourism professionnals who stopped an important part of their activities on behalf of the precautionary principle. Even if this brave decision put their companies in dire financial situations. Otherwise, we could have seen a bigger number of abductions in the area. 

Indeed, one of the first to sound the alarm bell at the end of 2010 was Maurice Freund, President of Point-Afrique. He pointed at the time the rise in number of AQIM fighters and the failure of Mali to deal with. The latest events confirm a posteriori the relevance of his statements, considered at the time as alarmist for no reason. He wrote "If the Tuareg population in its majority is in no way complicit with the terrorist, and is not attracted by their religious fanaticism, it is clear that young Tuareg join this nebula and lend them a hand (greed? sincere engagement? the choice of motives is wide ...)". Point-Afrique decided then a complete cessation of tourism activity in Algeria, stop Agadez and maintain activity south of Niamey in Niger, stop Gao/North Mali and maintain tourism in Dogon country for Mali, and launched an audit for Mauritania.

The failure of Bamako in the fight against crime and terrorism has come to alert other organizers of tourism trekking. "We have no confidence in the situation in Mali, with a total lack of control by the Government of Mali, and civil or military authorities riddled with corruption at the highest level" said Gérard Guerrier, president of "Collectif sécurité" of trekking agencies  ATT (Association des tour-opérateurs thématiques). 

Yes, French travel agencies have sounded the first alarm. They avoided already the area of Hombori for over a year, although it was classified only as "orange" by the Quai d'Orsay. On november 23, beyond the recommendations of French Foreign Ministry, the "Collectif sécurité" decided to suspend simply all travels to Mali, including the southern part with tourist sites such as Djenne and Dogon area. It is worth to note that these decisions were made before the two abductions in Hombori were known to the participants.

This leads to the main purpose of this article. Who are the two hostages Philippe Verdon and Serge Lazarevic?

Officially, Philippe Verdon led for several months a financial and mineral feasibility study for a cement unit in Hombori with a local partner "Les Ciments de Fatma-Mali SA". He promised  to obtain funds and capital from a South African financial company. Then on the night of November 23 to 24, at their hotel Doumbia in Hombori, Philippe Verdon and his friend Serge Lazarevic were abducted by a gang of seven armed men.

Much speculation has surrounded the past of these two men. They are now suspected by AQIM of being spies, which is particularly a life-threatening accusation.

Here are some thoughts on this duo :

1. Since when spies operate without false identity? Philippe Verdon and Serge Lazarevic had no fake identity. They were traveling with their real passports.

2. Serge Lazarevic was confused with Slobodan Lazarevic. The French Lazarevic, who is director of a small security company, subcontractor in the building industry,  was born in June 1963. While the Serbian Slobodan Lazarevic joined the Yugoslav Army's intelligence service in 1968! 

In the photo sent by AQIM, French Lazarevic is on the left,  while on thissite the Serbian is visible in uniform. A Homonymity on which most of the media did not pay attention.

3. The French were suspected of being secret agents, wanting to train a group of Tuareg fighters returning from Libya to tackle the AQIM. This project exists. It is funded by the European Union and other Western countries. The trainers are from different countries, Canada, Great Britain, European Union  and elsewhere. The supervision of training and structuring of joint units of the Malian army incorporating the Touareg is an official projet. It's not a secret and hidden operation, and above all it will be carried out by professionnals, soldiers and members of security forces, not by mercenaries.

4. Was the French Duo in a parallel negotiation with the AQIM to free the abducted French technicians in Arlit in Niger? Our two protagonists were new to the Malian and Sahelian scenes. They were apparently not in contact with local negotiators. They had in fact no detailed knowledge of the environment in which they were moving. And France dipose of other former military veterans with a better knowledge of the context there.

Clearly, the French duo was made up of two adventurers who pushed into the risk-return ratio the first argument a bit too far.

This brings me to the issue of logistical support to AQIM. Malians and Touareg overwhelmingly reject the ideology of AQIM, they do not support its activities. But only one informant per village is enough to provide them with crucial information, one sleeper cell is sufficient to achieve a one-time operation as a kidnapping, a small provider is enough for them to have the essentials for survival. They do not require a massive support of the local population.

Under these conditions, it is worthwhile to remember Maurice Freund statements there is almost a year. He wrote "One of my friends, Ag Aroudeni, brother of the amenokal Oulmeliden (the largest tribe Tuareg) confesses "no longer understand." And told me of his concern, because for some time in his commune, he sees moving preachers, some from Pakistan, that came to teach Salafism. Their preaching is accompanied by well construction, aid to the people and of course the construction of mosques. They are not terrorists, but they make the bed by exploiting Islam for political purposes. There is little time, AQIM members were a handful of one hundred to two hundred men. Now they approach or exceed the thousand fighters ... and sleeper cells are born everywhere!". 

The kidnapping in Hombori had nothing special. And coupled with the Tumbuktu event, they form together a signal of danger to all Western people in a larger area of the Sahel now.

An Arab proverb says that 'knowledge is closer to silence than to speech'. In his interview  with the Mauritanian news service ANI (Agence Nouakchott d’Information), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar (MBM) was prolific in different statements (@tweetsintheME provides a highly valuable analysis for that here ), but MBM has also intriguingly avoided to discuss some hot issues.

At first, we should question the conditions of realization of this interview. The interviewer gave no indication on the place, and provides no information on the atmosphere surrounding the meeting, if there were any meeting. 

MBM does not seem to remember that an armed group (that he was supposed to be leading) decapitated Mauritanians soldiers at Lemgheity in Mauritania, and has two successive and contradictory answers. Apart from the fact that some doubt is cast on his presence at the scene of the attack, the interview and its set of questions and answers seem to have been made in a discontinuous way. We can assume that it was made through a messenger or an intermediate tool, disrupting the linearity of the speech.

MBM doesn't mention the Italian and two Spaniards kidnapped from the Polisario's Rabuni camp near Tindouf in Algeria. More than a month after the operation, there has been no AQIM claim for the abduction of the three humanitarians. All assumptions are open, in the hands of subcontractors, abducted by another group of AQIM, under the (silent) control of MBM. Another explanation is that the interview was already outdated when published, if it were to be secretly transported by a courier back and forth in long delays.

On the issue of the truce, MBM denied rumors of agreement with the Algerian army. The pause in operations of his group in Algeria is just a part of a “strategic shift” in order to prepare for a new phase of action. On the Mauritanian side, the AQIM leader does not rule out a halt in attacks if Nouakchott's leaders are back on an acceptable religiously viewed track.

But what about relations with Mali? Unfortunately, MBM is not pushed on the subject. But in contrast to previous answers, his posture hinted to a truce, implicit or negotiated. An at the time of the interview, he did not announce the end of this Malian truce either.

So what was the main reason behind the press release? Implicitly, MBM multiplies the signs of allegiance to AQMI leaders. He shows his organization credentials. Is there an inner fear of a loss of influence in the Sahel? If the abduction of the Rabuni camp was set up by another group, this was a bold stroke since it was close to his rear base in Northern Mali. Does he face competition from newcomers? If so, how will he react to that?

A recent article by Mohamed Ben Ahmed of El Khabar newspaper explains that three kidnapping groups operate now in the Sahel/Sahara. Two of them are under the control of Abdelhakim Abu Zeid and AQIM central structure. The third one is operating independently under the command of MBM. The three groups seem to have engaged in sort of emulation at kidnapping. El Khabar's article gives a description of the MBM group done by the Algerian security services. Here is a rough translation of the paragraph on MBM:

"The third group (of kidnappers in the Sahel) is made up of mercenaries and elements non-organically affiliated with AQIM. MBM is the Emir of the Katiba of Mulathemeen (Battalion of the Masked), he coordinates its activities and makes the liaison with AQIM central structure. His group was involved in the kidnapping of the UN envoy Robert Fowler, that has since been released. It is believed that the group has recently abandoned the truce. MBM band is the most connected group to smuggling networks and to networks of mercenaries led by deserters from the Malian army. The three kidnapping groups activate to fund AQIM. There have been several killings and eliminations of members of the band due to conflicts on the use of ransom and income from smuggling. The murder of the brother in law of MBM, which took place a few months ago, is related to such disputes."

The one-eyed or “Belaouar” as he is nicknamed  is sort of a media figure,  his career is one of the longest in the jihadist movement. As media notoriety doesn't equal presence on the ground, does he still have a great influence on Sahelian events? With his amazing ability to survive in what may appear as a hostile environment, MBM is not devoid of strengths thanks to the networks around him. If the truce between AQIM and Mali is over, as evidenced by recent events, it is hard for MBM to stay watching and not try to reap new benefits of the situation.

With so many remaining questions, it is useful to remember that other Arab proverb "speech is silver and silence is golden". MBM and AQIM are aware of it. The sudy of their activities could be enriched through this separator prism. 

Jeudi 20 octobre 2011.

Quatre différences et une similitude.

1. Ennahda n’est pas le FIS.

Ennahda n’est pas sur la même ligne idéologique que l’ex-FIS. Il s’est démarqué des groupuscules salafistes et semble prendre comme exemple le parti turc d’Erdogan. Les propos du porte-parole du parti Ennahda, Samir Dilou, sont à ce titre suffisamment clairs: « Nous ne voulons pas une théocratie. Nous voulons un État démocratique qui se caractérise par l'idée de la liberté. Le peuple doit décider par lui-même comment il vit [...] Nous ne sommes pas un parti islamiste, nous sommes un parti islamique, qui obtient aussi sa direction par les principes du Coran. »

 Aujourd’hui même, Rached Ghannouchi a dit  « Il faudra accepter les résultats et nous nous allierons avec tous ceux qui accepteront de s’allier avec nous, pourvu que nous puissions nous entendre sur le programme ».

Le FIS était lui sur une ligne insurrectionnelle, bien avant les élections du 26 décembre 1991. Pour rappel, quelques déclarations des dirigeants FIS de l’époque: 

 Abassi Madani: « Pas de Charte ni de Constitution. Seul le Coran ». 

Ali Benhadj: La démocratie est « un concept étranger, et un mot qui n'existe dans aucun dictionnaire de langue arabe, ni dans le Coran, ni dans la Sunna ».

Et la fameuse phrase « La démocratie est un péché » d’Ali Benhadj.

2. L'élection en Tunisie est celle d’une assemblée constituante.

Il n’y a pas eu d’assemblée constituante en Algérie. Le président Chadli Bendjedid avait dans la foulée des émeutes d’octobre 88, promis des réformes, et fait voter une nouvelle constitution le 26 février 1989. Le texte fondamental avait été rédigé avec l’aide d’experts constitutionnalistes français. Il était construit autour du rôle central du président de la république, sur le modèle de la constitution de la Vème république française.

L’escamotage du débat sur un texte aussi essentiel allait rejaillir par la suite. Dans sa charte du 7 mars 1989, le FIS ne reconnaissait pas le texte voté quelques jours plus tôt. Il avait alors déclaré “Toutes les instances de l'exécutif doivent être réformées: présidence, gouvernement, département, commune...”  Les graines de la confrontation avaient en fait déjà été semées.

En Tunisie, il est probable qu’Ennahda n’aura pas les coudées franches pour établir une constitution faite sur mesure pour lui. Il devra négocier, s’associer, faire des compromis avec d’autres forces politiques pour influer sur les choix constitutonnels. Mais une fois la constitution établie, elle bénéficiera d'une légitimité large auprès du paysage politique.